Major Event Report

Date of Major Event: December 27th, 2024

Prior to the Major Event

1. Did the distributor have any prior warning that the Major Event would occur?
No

Additional Comments
N/A

2. If the distributor did have prior warning, did the distributor arrange to have extra employees on duty or on standby prior to the Major Event beginning?
N/A

Brief description of arrangements, or explain why extra employees were not arranged.
N/A

3. If the distributor did have prior warning, did the distributor issue any media announcements to the public warning of possible outages resulting from the pending Major Event?
N/A

4. Did the distributor train its staff on the response plans to prepare for this type of Major Event?
Yes

During the Major Event

1. Please identify the main contributing cause of the Major Event as per the table in section 2.1.4.2.5 of the Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements.
Others

Please provide a brief description of the event (i.e. what happened?). If selected "Other", please explain.
On Monday December 27, 2024 at 8:54 pm, during dark and poor rainy weather conditions, a vehicle swerved into the oncoming traffic, causing a multiple vehicular accident, and then struck and broke a hydro pole. The pole was installed far away from the curb, behind a sidewalk, exceeding minimum clearance requirements. This caused an outage to 7,374 customers across two main feeders as this pole location carried two feeders.

Using automated devices, nearly 50% of customers were restored within ten minutes, and the next 20% of customers restored in 1.5 hours after reports were received of the accident location. Due to the location of the incident, a temporary switch was required to be installed to safely isolate the accident location, make the necessary repairs, and restore power to the remaining groups of customers.

OEB Cause Code; Foreign Interference – Vehicle Accident

2. Was the IEEE Standard 1366* used to derive the threshold for the Major Event?
***The OEB preferred option**
Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366

3. When did the Major Event begin?
Date: December 27th, 2024
Time (for example HH:MM AM): 8:54 PM

4. Did the distributor issue any information about this Major Event, such as estimated times of restoration, to the public during the Major Event?
Yes

If yes, please provide a brief description of the information. If no, please explain.
London Hydro issues estimated times of restoration (ETR) for the various outage events through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information.

5. How many customers were interrupted during the Major Event?
7,374 customers

What percentage of the distributor's total customer base did the interrupted customers represent?
4.38%

6. How many hours did it take to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted?
6 hours

Additional Comments
The major event started at 8:54pm on December 27th, and over 90% of customers were restored by 2:42am on December 28th.

7. Were there any outages associated with Loss of Supply during the Major Event?
No

If so, please report on the duration and frequency of Loss of Supply outages.
N/A

8. In responding to the Major Event, did the distributor utilize assistance through a third-party mutual assistance agreement with other utilities?
No

9. Did the distributor run out of any needed equipment or materials during the Major Event?
No

If so, please describe the shortages.
N/A

After the Major Event

1. What steps, if any, are being taken to be prepared for or mitigate such Major Events in the future (i.e., staff training, process improvements, system upgrades)?
Others

Additional Comments:
For the specific accident location, the temporary sectionalizing switch was left permanently to provide switching capabilities to aid in the restoration of any future outages in the area.

This 'foreign interference – vehicle accident' could have potentially been prevented by undergrounding circuits in the area, however vehicle accidents can occur anywhere throughout the city and undergrounding all intersections is not a reasonable solution. London Hydro must tactfully determine the appropriate and cost-effective reliability improvement measures (which may include the installation of overhead sectionalizing switches, automated devices, or undergrounding the circuits) for various intersections considering the design of the system in that area and the potential impact of a similar accident.